Abstract
companies. Parties with an interest in a company, notwithstanding managers and auditors, can observe and measure these characteristics to detect and identify such fraud. 
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, a number of local companies familiar to the public encountered accounting risk problems and, in some cases, also financial statement fraud problems. Among these companies are Macmed, NAIL, Beige, Masterbond, Saambou, Regal Bank, Unifer, Leisurenet and NRB.
Some still survive to this day, but most of them collapsed once the irregularities were discovered.
The parties who have an interest in a company do not only want to see the company prosper in terms of exceptional financial performance and a strong financial position. They also want to see the company display a strong presence in the market and a positive image in the media. For this reason, ethical behaviour is essential. It is, however, difficult for people both in and outside a company to determine whether a company, through its employees and management, displays satisfactory ethical behaviour and does not engage in activities that can increase a company's accounting risk and create the possibility of financial fraud occurring.
The aim of the study was to determine whether there are any means by which parties, internal and external to a company, can establish if a company displays a greater accounting risk and/or perhaps a greater likelihood of the occurrence of financial statement fraud. This was done through a literature analysis of the findings of previous researchers. The article commences with some background on financial statement fraud. Thereafter, an analysis of previous research is presented, followed by the conclusions and areas of further research.
FINANCIAL STATEMENT FRAUD
The occurrence of financial statement fraud
In 1995, the United States Chamber of Commerce estimated that the annual cost of fraud exceeded $100 billion (Glover & Aono, 1995:3) . Two of the largest bankruptcies in America in the 1990s were due to fraud, namely those of Enron and WorldCom (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006: 3).
On the domestic front, the South African Police Service (SAPS) reported that South Africa lost R3,4 billion due to commercial crime in the first six months of 1999 (Minnaar-V an Veijeren, 2000c:38) . However, according to more recent crime statistics, the incidence of commercial crime is steadily decreasing (South African Police Service, 2005 Even though it may well be that this type of crime is being reduced, it is also possible that fraudsters are becoming smarter and that fraud is not detected, or onl y reported to a lesser extent.
It is, however, certain that the appearance of financial statement fraud is changing due to greater transparency, faster and more open communication and amounts that appear larger because of inflation (Du Plessis, 2001:4) . Other reasons for the change are the globalisation of trade and the use of technology. This provides opportunities for crimes to be committed across borders. The speed and volume of transaction handling have also increased due to changing technology. The
Internet and other networks make it easier to gain access to an organisation. Records of liquid assets, such as cash and inventory, are increasingly stored in computer systems as electronic information. It is therefore easier to manipulate records and misappropriate liquid assets.
Financial statement fraud defined
To understand financial statement fraud better, it is useful to look at the various definitions of fraud. The Institute ofInternal Auditors (IIA) (2001) defines fraud as "an array of irregularities and illegal acts characterised by intentional deception". Turner (in Elliot & Willingham, 1980:97) and Robertson (2002:5) define fraud more broadly as "all means that human ingenuity can devise, and which are resorted to by an individual to get an advantage over another by false suggestions or suppression of the truth". This type of fraud includes surprises, tricks, cunning, dissembling and any other unfair way by which another person is cheated.
The definition of financial statement fraud is essentially the same as that of fraud, apart from a few additional aspects. The International Standard of Auditing (lSA) 240 (IAASB, 2007:272) defines corporate fraud as "an intentional act by one or more individuals among management, those charged with governance, employees or third parties, involving the use of deception to obtain an unjust or illegal advantage". Financial statement fraud is thus fraud committed by the management of an organisation with the goal to artificially improve the financial performance and results of the company as stated in the financial statements. This is done most often by means of overstating assets and revenue or understating liabilities and expenses.
Financial statement fraud must be clearly distinguished from non-fraudulent earnings management and accounting errors. Non-fraudulent earnings management takes place when a legitimate generally accepted accounting practice (GAAP) method is applied, but only because it has a favourable impact on the financial statements (Rezaee, 2002 ). An example is a company's management decision to use certain inventory valuation or depreciation methods. Such practices must, however, also be looked upon critically, as it can lead to greater accounting risk in the financial statements of a company. Accounting risk refers to the increased risk of a company's management perpetrating financial statement fraud at some stage in the future to improve the appearance of financial performance and position.
Errors, on the other hand, are unintentional mistakes that appear in financial statements, occurrences that happen without intent. As a result of the lack of intent, errors are normally easier to detect. To make it more difficult to trace, the perpetrator of fraud goes to great lengths to conceal intentional fraudulent misstatements. Sherman, Young and Collingwood (2003 :6) compare fraudulent accounting entries to landmines in the books of a company. These "landmines" are hidden in the books and records of companies and may never "detonate".
However, in a case where such an "accounting landmine" is discovered or "detonated", its effects can have a devastating impact on the confidence of investors, creditors, the public and many other related parties.
2.3
How and why fraud occurs
Fraud, especially fraud on behalf of a company, tends to come with a certain organisational culture. It does not mean that a company engaging in fraudulent activities has to have a negative culture. In many cases, it is a positive one where individuals identifY strongly with the goals and well-being of a company and want what they believe is best for the company and for themselves.
Characteristics associated with fraud include loyalty, cohesiveness, trust, aggressiveness and other attributes mostly valued by companies as traits they prefer in their employees (Elliot & Willingham, 1980: 177) . Corporate fraudsters may therefore act with the best intentions and often do not realise that they are acting fraudulently. Robertson (2002) is of the opinion that management behaviour is the main cause behind corporate fraud, as managers are the primary influence in unethical decision-making. They "set the tone at the top" and create what becomes the ethical norm.
Robertson ( Source: Adapted from Wells (1997: 11) These elements are present in various forms in the characteristics of a firm that engages in fraudulent activities. The elements are as follows (in no particular order):
1.
Opportunity is an open door to solve a problem by violating a trust. The higher the position of a person in the organisational hierarchy, the more trust is placed in himlher and the greater his/her opportunity to commit fraud.
2. Rationalisation (integrity or pressures) is the ability to act according to self-perceived moral and ethical values. Fraudsters find a way to rationalise their actions and make it acceptable for themselves.
3. Motive (incentive) is pressures that a person experiences. These can be "psychotic" (related to habit), egocentric (related to personal prestige), ideological (believing that the cause is morally superior) or economic (related to a need for money).
To get back to the reasons for financial statement fraud specifically, Robertson (2002:105) 
2.4
The effects of fmancial statement fraud
Financial statement fraud has larger implications than many managers realise. For many, it is only a means to improve results, but apart from harming the company in which it is being perpetrated, it can also affect economic markets. Rezaee (2002:7) gives the following summary of the potential harmful effects of financial statement fraud:
• it undermines the quality and integrity of the financial reporting process;
• it jeopardises the integrity and objectivity of the accounting profession;
• it diminishes the confidence of capital markets and market participants in the reliability of financial information;
• it makes the capital market less efficient;
• it adversely affects a nation's growth and prosperity;
• it may result in litigation losses;
• it destroys the careers of individuals involved in the fraud;
• it causes bankruptcy or economic losses by the company engaged in the fraud;
• it encourages a higher level of regulatory intervention; and
• it causes destructions to the normal operations and performance of the alleged companies.
At least for the above reasons, it is necessary to attempt the prevention of fraud incidences. A profile that is developed to analyse a company's character and situation can help interested parties in a proactive way to protect their interests.
The detection and identification of financial statement fraud
In the past there has been a misconception that auditors are responsible for the detection and identification of financial statement fraud. However, auditors' main responsibility is to express an opinion about whether financial statements are prepared within an acceptable accounting framework and thus provide assurance that financial statements are free from material misstatement, whether caused by fraud or error (IAASB, 2007:275) . This also relates to the definition of an audit as it is set out in the Auditing Profession Act 26 (2005) . According to the Act, "audit" means the examination of financial statements in accordance with applicable auditing standards with the objective of expressing an opinion as to their fairness and compliance with a financial reporting framework and any applicable statutory requirements. This implies that auditors should focus on events that have the potential to lead to materially misleading financial statements, but that it is not their sole responsibility to detect and identify such occurrences.
According to ISA 240 (IAASB 2007:274-276) , the responsibility of the auditor in the detection and identification of financial statement fraud is limited to retaining an attitude of professional scepticism and considering the possibility of management override of controls. An auditor cannot provide complete assurance that material misstatements will be detected, because of the use of judgment, the use of testing, the inherent limitations of internal control and the fact that much of the audit evidence available to the auditor is persuasive rather than conclusive in nature.
However, if an auditor does come across any material irregularity, Section 45 of the Auditing Profession Act (2005) states that the auditor has a duty to report such material irregularities to the Independent Regulatory Board for Auditors. This duty includes firstly the sending of a written notice to the management of the entity to inform them about the report. Secondly, discussions between the auditors and the management of the entity ensue, in which management are given an opportunity to make representations in respect of the irregularity and a chance to correct the irregularity if they recognise it as a mistake on their part. These discussions and possible changes to the financial statements are to be followed by a second report to the Regulatory Board for Auditors to state whether the situation has changed or stayed the same. For the purpose of the above-mentioned reports, the auditor should get access to any information that may be necessary to carry out additional audit procedures. The fact that auditors cannot be held solely responsible for the detection and identification of financial statement fraud and because managers are often the most likely perpetrators of the fraud, has created an awareness that parties other than auditors and managers should also be responsible for helping authorities with the detection and identification process. It is important for all parties with an interest in a company, not only the managers and auditors, to be aware that financial statements cannot be trusted completely (Glover & Aono, 1995:8) , and to be on the lookout for questionable practices and activities. Rosplock (2001 :24) mentions various statistical and subjective measures that can be used in an investigation. It is particularly important to observe financial information and ratios, using industry and economic data to determine trends, bankruptcy and cash flow risk, information disclosed in notes, the rate of financing and substantial suits, liens or judgments that can have an effect on the company. Most of this information can be found in the financial statements or the notes that accompany the statements.
Glover and Aono (1995:7) point out that a lot can also be learnt from observing additional subjective aspects such as corporate culture, employee turnover, average employee tenure, the nature of customer complaints, product quality, employee morale and employee benefits, the corporate board meeting minutes and other policies and procedures. Information which can be helpful and which is often available in the annual reports is legal battles, credit ratings, investment in employee development, warranty expenses and comparisons of wages with industry averages. Industry trait information is also publicly available and includes industry trade journals, business periodicals and newspapers from which new trends can be observed. However, it requires a lot of time and effort to research these, something a private investor or other interested party may not have. Schilit (1993:19) gives a list of other documents that can be observed to detect and identify financial statement fraud, namely:
• the auditor's report, whether a qualified report was given and/or if an opinion was withheld;
• the proxy statement for pending litigation and executive compensation;
• footnotes for accounting policy changes, related-party transactions and other contingencies or commitments;
• the chairman's letter to determine the forthrightness of management; and
• other quantitative documentation that may give more information on management practices, disputes/disagreements and past performance.
A few articles note that measures to detect fraud, such as the above, are only applicable in certain circumstances (Elliot & Willingham, 1980:95) . This is because there are a multitude of ways in which fraud can be perpetrated and fraudsters are constantly devising new methods. If more methods are used in analysis to detect and identify fraud, the chances of coming across an irregularity are better. It can be detrimental to a study of financial statements if it is too limited.
However, it remains possible that the correct mindset can help to detect the presence of fraud.
Financial statement fraud will decline in frequency and severity if more is learnt about it and if that knowledge is used to prevent it (Cressey, 1986: 195) . Punishing and incapacitating violators of the law would probably help to reduce financial statement fraud, but measures must be implemented to prevent fraud from happening in the first place. No company is immune against the onslaught of fraud and it is becoming the responsibility of everyone -not only managers and auditors -to be aware of fraud and the means to prevent it.
THE AIM AND METHOD OF THE STUDY
From the research of various authors, some of which were mentioned in the previous section, it has been found that many researchers agree that the financial statements can be used to detect and identifY financial statement fraud occurrences.
This study set out to determine from worldwide research by various autbors whetber companies with a higher accounting and financial statement fraud risk tend to display specific behavioural characteristics. If this proved to be the case, such characteristics could be integrated into a model of characteristics which auditors, managers and other interested parties can be aware of as potential indicators to assist them in the detection and identification of financial statement fraud.
In order to test whether such behavioural characteristics do exist, research by various authors who wrote about financial statement fraud was sourced from a variety of books and journals.
These research studies emanated from around the world, but mostly from the USA. The specific topics or titles of the books and research articles were not considered, only whether the studies made reference to financial statement fraud.
From the work of these authors, categories of behavioural characteristics were identified and analysed. These characteristics include both quantitative and qualitative aspects of business operations. The purpose was to determine each researcher's final conclusion or opinion of a specific behavioural characteristic. The identified characteristics were further analysed to eliminate those of which the authors had opposing views. The end goal was to identify all the characteristics on which previous researchers reached consensus and which they found could be used successfully to identifY a company that displays a higher accounting risk and therefore has a greater possibility of financial statement fraud. This will provide interested parties with a range of characteristics that can be applied to evaluate a company's accounting andlor financial statement fraud risk.
A REVIEW OF PREVIOUS LITERATURE AND RESULTS
Previous research and literature
Much has been written on the subject of financial statement fraud. Most of the existing literature emanates from the USA. Some authors are Apostolou, Hassell and Webber (2001) , Baucus and Near (1991) , Beasley (1996) , Beasley, Carcello and Hermanson (2001) , Beasley, Carcello,
Hermanson and Lapides (2000), Bell and Carcello (2000) , Beneish (1997) , Calderon and Green (1994) , Cressey (1986) , Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996) , DeFond and Jiambalvo (1991), Gerety and Lehn (1997) , Kinney and McDaniel (1989) , Mitchell (1997) , Robertson (2002) , Saksena (2001) , Summers and Sweeney (1998) , Tipgos (2002) and Wells (1990 Wells ( , 1997 Wells ( ,2001 ).
The studies of these authors focus mostly on the theoretical aspects of financial statement fraud and the characteristics of companies that engage in fraudulent activity. Little attention has so far been given exclusively to the detection and identification of fraud in financial statements.
Articles discussing the detection and identification of fraud tend to be geared towards the auditor's responsibility for detecting and identifying fraud, for example, Connelley (2003), Daroca and Holder (1985) , Glover and Aono (1995) Heiman-Hoffman, Morgan and Patton (1996) , Holder (1983) , Hylas and Ashton (1982) , Kaminski, Wetzel and Guan (2004) , Kinney (1979) , Krambia-Kapardis (2002), Lee, Ingram and Howard (1999) , Lendez and Korevec (1999) , Moyes and Hasan (1996) , Nieschwietz, Schultz and Zimbelman (2000) and Persons (1995) .
These are, therefore, mainly aimed at auditors as the audience.
Thus far there have been little academic writing and research in South Africa on the topic of local financial statement fraud (see Cameron-Ellis, 2000; Christophers, 2005; Dawson, 2001; Du Plessis, 1997 , 1999a , I 999b, 2001 Du Plessis & Koornhof, 2000; Minnaar-Van Veijeren, 2000a , 2000b , 2000c Savage, 2003; Vaksman, 2004; Van Wyk, 2004 ). The quality of the available articles is arguably not of the same standard as those from the USA (most of these articles appeared in business magazines and not in accredited scholarly journals). A conference in Johannesburg in 2004 dealt with fraud issues (Padgett, 2004; Perumaul, 2004) . Only a few of the South African studies mentioned above deal with methods of detecting fraud and identifying its occurrence.
4.2
The results of various authors' f"mdings
The 22 most important categories of company characteristics, as identified in an analysis of the works of the above-mentioned authors and other studies, are set out in Table 1 . Some of the categories are subjective and others obj ective. These are arranged in alphabetical order, as the importance of the individual characteristics is not considered in this study. Beneish (1997) Younger finns Fridson & Alvarez (2002) Younger companies Lee, Ingram & Howard (1999) Younger finns Schilit (1993) Recently became public company Shennan, Young & Collingwood (2003) Younger companies often have unconventional methods 5. Company size Baucus & Near (1991) Large finns Beasley (1996) Cresse~(1986) Finns in smaller towns violate the law more Davia, Coggins, Wideman, Kastantin (2000) Smaller companies are the largest fraudsters DeFond & Iiambalvo (1991) Smaller companies Fridson & Alvarez (2002) Small and large companies Errors in revenue cycle, property, plant and equipment, prepaid Hylas and Ashton (1982) expenses, deferred charges and other assets occur more in smaller companies while errors in inventory, notes receivable and other liabilities tend to occur more in larger companies Kinne~ & McDaniel (1989) Smaller finns Persons (1995) Smaller finns Rezaee (2002) Large and decentralised Saksena (2001) Larger finns 6. Control Albrecht, Cherrington, Payne, Roe & Ronmey Poor internal control ,i~ Elliot & Willingham (1980) r _~ostolou, Hassell & Webber (200 I) Poor attitude towards internal control Bell & Carcello (2000) Weak internal control Calderon & Green (1994) Weak internal control Davia, Coggins, Wideman, Kastantin (2000) No adaptation of controls to changes Dechow, Sloan & Sweeney (1996) Beneish (1997) More leveraged growth-firms Dechow, Sloan & Sweeney (1996) More leveraged positions DeFond & Jiambalvo (1991) High leverage lAASB (2004) Problems to meet debt repayments or covenant requirements Kinney & McDaniel (1989) Highly leveraged companies Lee, Ingram & Howard (1999) Highly leveraged firms Mitchell (1997) High debt National Commission on Fraudulent Financial
High debt and problems to comply with debt covenants (2000) A weak and inexperienced board of directors Mostly insiders on the board of directors Dechow, Sloan & Sweeney (1996) CEO is company founder and the board chairman No audit committee " Fond & Jiambalvo (1991) No audit committee
Fridson & Alvarez (2002) Lack of an audit committee Poor audit committee Lee, Ingram & Howard (1999) More internal than external directors CEO that controls board of directors Mills (2003) Not majority of independent outsiders (audit committee included) Loans to directors Not full-time membership on board of directors Mitchell (1997) Frequent changes to board members National Commission on Fraudulent Financial
Absence of directors and/or audit committee Reporting (1987) Mostly insiders on the board of directors Short tenure of outside directors Rezaee (2002) Lack of corporate governance Ineffective boards of directors Not enough independent directors on the board Audit committees (if any) not independent and ineffective f,- Schilit (1993) Too few independent members on the board of directors he .erman, Young & Collingwood (2003) Head of the audit committee not independent Van Wyk (2004) One person both the chairman and CEO 10. Financial distress Apostolou, Hassell & Webber (2001) Threat of bankruptcy Du Plessis (1999b) Lack of financial stability Lee, Ingram & Howard (1999) Experiencing fmancial distress National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Financial pressure Reporting (1987) Persons (1995) Financial difficulty Robertson (2002) Going-concern problems Saksena (2001) Threat of insolvency Summers & Sweeney (1998) Poor financial conditions 11. Geographic location Albrecht, Cherrington, Payne, Roe & Romney Decentralised in Elliot & Willingham (1980) Bell & Carcello (2000) Decentralised Calderon & Green (1994) Decentralised Du Plessis (1999b) Remote locations Significant operations located across international borders lAASB (2004) Bank accounts or operations in tax-haven jurisdictions for which no clear justification exists Price (1991) Multinational companies are more difficult to control
Robertson ( (2000) Rapid growth Sales, mergers, purchases, acquisitions Beneish (1997) Slower sales growth Calderon & Green (1994) Rapid growth "how, Sloan & Sweeney (1996) Higher-growth opportunities DeFond & Jiambalvo (1991) Smaller growth in earnings Du Plessis (1999b) Mismatch between growth and systems development Fridson & Alvarez (2002) Previous rapid growth now declining lAASB (2004) Rapid growth, especially compared to others in the industry Kinney & McDaniel (1989) Slower growing companies Lee, Ingram & Howard (1999) High growth Larger sales growth Powell & Wilkinson (2002) Rapid growth High earnings growth expectations Rezaee (2002) Unusually rapid growth Rapid expansion Robertson (200:2) Rapid growth -leads to loss of control Schilit (1993) Fast growth beginning to slow Very weak, trying to improve Shennan, Young & Collingwood (2003) Falsely creating slower growth in a high-growth finn to refute negative imyact if results are expected to really falter later TImers & Sweeney (1998) Rapid growth It also happens that fraud is used to hide slower-growth rates 13. Indusjry Albrecht, Cherrington, Payne, Roe & Romney Poor economic conditions in industry in Elliot & Willingham (1980) Heavy com£etition New accounting requirements in industry High degree of competition Apostolou, Hassell & Webber (200 I) Declining industry Rapid industry changes Vulnerability to changing technology and product obsolescence History and structure of an industry No enforcement agencies or regulatory bodies present Baucus & Near (1991) Inherent uncertainties Dynamic enviromnents Specifically foods, lumber, petroleum refining and automobiles Beasley (1996) Calderon & Green (1994) Industry decline Transport Communication Dechow, Sloan & Sweeney (1996) Wholesale and retail Manufacturing Business services Du Plessis (I 999b )
Certain industry conditions Ernst & Young (2003) Results that are out of line with the rest of the industry Fridson & Alvarez (2002) New industry Hylas and Ashton (1982) Some errors occur more frequently in certain companies
.. (2000) Certain industries display more fraudulent behaviour Computer and data processing, scientific and medical instrument Persons (1995) manufacturing, household appliances and electronic equipment manufacturing and computer manufacturing Some industry cultures increase fraud probability Sudden industry decline CEO Mills (2003) Transactions that lead to conflict of interests Loans to senior executives Mitchell (1997) High manager turnover National Commission on Fraudulent Financial A few managers dominate (2004) Unusual profitability, especially compared to others in the industry Kinney & McDaniel (1989) Less profitable Lee, Ingram & Howard (1999) Higher earnings National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Sudden decreases Reporting (1987) Persons (1995) Lower profitability Powell & Wilkinson (2002) Poor return on capital employed Inconsistent profit and revenue trends Rezaee (2002) Decline in the quality and quantity of earnings Robertson (2002) Emphasis on earnings Saksena (2001) Poor financial performance
;""hilit (1993) Sudden high profitability J Sudden low profitability Sherman, Young & Collingwood (2003) Working towards specific earnings targets Summers & Sweeney (1998) High profitability 18. Receivables and inventories Beneish (1997) Decline in inventory and receivable turnovers Fridson & Alvarez (2002) Increased receivables Lee, Ingram & Howard (1999) Larger amounts of receivables and inventories Nieschwietz, Schultz Jr & Zimbelman (2000) Asset overstatement Persons (1995) Overstatement of receivables and inventories Excessive bad debt resulting from inability to collect receivables High inventory values, indicating overstatement Rezaee (2002) Inventories stored in unusual locations or manners Special expertise needed to value inventory Increase in inventory without increase in sales Large amounts of overdue receivables Schilit (1993) Related-party receivables Slow receivables and/or receivables turnover
Large growth of inventory without growth in sales Sweeney (1998) High inventory relative to sales 19. Remuneration Bell & Carcello (2000) Remuneration based on performance Calderon & Green (1994) Remuneration based on recorded performance Dechow, Sloan & Sweeney (1996) Remuneration based on earnings Du Plessis (1999b) Compensation tied to performance Ernst & Young (2003) Remuneration based on financial performance IAASB (2004) Significant compensation portions contingent on aggressive financial targets Rezaee (2002) Compensation for executives linked to earnings or stock price targets Robertson (2002) Remuneration Bell & Carcello (2000) Management holds a significant portion of company's shares Beneish (1997) Large number of shares held by management Calderon & Green (1994) Represent a significant portion of management's own wealth Lee, Ingram & Howard (1999) More equity securities issued Nieschwietz, Schultz Jr & Zimbelman (2000) Publicly owned compiillies High level of share ownership by management Rezaee (2002) Low stockholding by outside directors (no incentive for them to exert stronger control) 21. Stock market performance Albrecht, Cherrington, Payne, Roe & Romney Suspension or delisting in Elliot & Willingham (1980 ) Beneish (1997 Poor stock market performance iPoor performance ,-,~chow, Sloan & Sweeney (1996) Higher market-to-book ratios Du Plessis (1999b) Not meeting expectations Lee, Ingram & Howard (1999) Poor stock market performance Larger market values relative to assets National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Sudden decreases ReIJorting (1987) Recently started trading publicly Rezaee (2002) High prices (need more earnings to support it) Suspension or delisting from stock exchange 22. Structure Albrecht, Cherrington, Payne, Roe & Romney Complex structure in Elliot & Willingham (1980) Apostolou, Hassell & Webber (2001) Complex structures Du Plessis (1999b) Complex structures Ernst & Young (2003) Complex corporate structure lAASB (2004) Complex structure V 'nney & McDaniel (1989) Changes in business conditions and structure L~ndez & Korevec (1999) Complex structures Mitchell (1997) Complex business structure National Commission on Fraudulent Financial
Complex structure Reporting (1987) Structure changes Rezaee (2002) Complex structure Frequent changes Robertson (2002) Complex structure Sherman, Young & Collingwood (2003) Complex ownership and financial structures Van Wyk (2004) Inadequate corporate governance structures
Of the 22 characteristics and behaviours that were observed, 18 showed a definitive trend that can be an indication of irregularities. Table 3 presents the four characteristics out of the 22 for which no clear conclusion was reached. 17.
Growth
Profitability market performance tended to be older or Inconclusive outcome. Slow growth gives an incentive to improve results through unethical means. On the other hand, fast growth has to b e ' often fraudulent means. Inconclusive outcome. Poor profitability gives an incentive to improve by unethical means while good profitability has to be maintained Inconclusive outcome. Poor performance gives an incentive to improve by unethical means while good performance has to be maintained. Table 4 is a summary of the 18 remaining characteristics that may be indicative of irregularities together with the specific behaviour that is most often displayed in cases of unethical and/or fraudulent actions. Parties that have an interest in a company can use these characteristics to make an assessment of the company's accounting and/or financial statement fraud risk.
CONCLUSION
From an analysis of the research results of a number of book and journal authors, 22 behavioural characteristics were identified as being present when companies have a greater accounting risk and perhaps a greater likelihood to engage in financial statement fraud. From these 22 characteristics, four were eliminated as a result of showing inconclusive results while the remaining 18 characteristics were identified as similar to behaviour in companies that engage in financial statement fraud. These characteristics can be used as a model by any party with an interest in a company to assess the company's likelihood of engaging in unethical and perhaps fraudulent activities. These characteristics can also be used to create a profile for companies with a higher risk of defrauding investors and the public.
The results of the study also provide proof that it is not enough to analyse only the quantitative information on a company in order to determine its accounting risk and/or propensity for financial statement fraud actions. Qualitative information may also have significant predictive power. This predictive power arises from cultural and other qualitative characteristics that tend to be the norm in companies with a higher accounting and/or financial statement fraud risk.
It is important to note that the 18 behavioural characteristics that were positively identified as fraud risk indicators in the previous section do not necessarily provide definitive proof of unethical behaviour, accounting risk and/or fraudulent activity. Many of the actions that are taken by managers may be totally within the law, but can be used to fulfil the same purpose as financial statement fraud. However, such accounting practices heighten accounting risk and have the potential to develop into fraud and are thus worth detecting in advance.
If the indicators are to be used by outside parties alone (therefore excluding parties with internal information like managers and auditors), the list of 18 characteristics may have to be shortened even more, as some of the characteristics may not be analysable due to a lack of information.
One example is the control environment. The information related to the internal functions of a company is not readily available to outsiders. Relationships with auditors and information about the lifestyles of personnel are also not available. Apart from information that is not available, some of the characteristics about which information can be easily obtained are difficult to
analyse. One such category is the industry in which a company operates. The criteria for determining which factors indicate a volatile industry are not formally defined.
However, with or without further sifting, some of the characteristics can be applied successfully in assessing the accounting risk a company faces, as well as the possibility of financial statement fraud.
FURTHER RESEARCH
There is still room for further analysis of the characteristics that companies display in order to determine if there is truth in the concept of indicators of possible financial statement fraud. The author is currently busy with further analysis into the characteristics and behavioural aspects of companies that engage( d) in financial statement fraud. The results from the study will possibly be presented in a follow-up article.
